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Abstract. This paper defines The Dead Cryptographers Society Problem – DCS (where 
several great cryptographers created many polynomial-time Deterministic Turing Machines 
(DTMs) of a specific type, ran them on their proper descriptions concatenated with some 
arbitrary strings, deleted them and left only the results from those running, after they died: if 
those DTMs only permute and sometimes invert the bits on input, is it possible to decide the 
language formed by such resulting strings within polynomial time?), proves some facts about 
its computational complexity, and discusses some possible uses on Cryptography, such as into 
distance keys distribution, online reverse auction and secure communication. 
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1.  Introduction 
  
In [1], I have promised some practical applications for some new concepts over there 
introduced to the Theoretical Computer Science community. 
 
In this little paper, I hope I begin to pay that promise. 
 
 
2.  The Dead Cryptographers Society Problem 
 
Definition 2.1. Poly-Time Permuting/Inverting DTM (PTPI DTM). A DTM 
(deterministic Turing Machine, or an algorithm or computer program with unbounded 
memory) M is a PTPI DTM iff its only function is to take a [finite but unbounded] string of n 
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input bits and produce from them a string of n bits that forms a permutation of the input, and 
then an arbitrary number of bits, from none to all them, are inverted in order to generate the 
output: M(b1b2...bn) = rσ(1)rσ(2)...rσ(n), where each ri is an individual bit, 1 ≤ σ(i) ≤ n, σ(i) = σ(j) 
⇔ i = j, and either rσ(i) = bσ(i) or rσ(i) = ¬bσ(i). Moreover, a PTPI DTM M running on empty 
(null) string returns a string representing the running time upper bound for that machine M 
(“T(n) = 1000*n^2”, for example, where n = |input|). 
 
Definition 2.2. The Dead Cryptographers Society Problem (DCS). The DCS is an 
Lz-language [2] L, or a promise problem [9] ∏, where the promise is the set formed with all 
words (or binary strings) w generated by some PTPI DTM M running on binary description or 
code of another arbitrary PTPI DTM N concatenated with some arbitrary binary string s: ∏YES 
U ∏NO = M(〈N,s〉), and ∏YES is the subset formed with all w when N is the proper binary 
description or code of that same DTM M: ∏YES = M(〈M,s〉). Remember that M running on 
empty string returns a string representing the polynomial running time bound for M itself. 
 
Theorem 2.1. The DCS is in NP. 
 
Proof. See that the DCS is in NP [2] (in Promise-NP [9, 11], more precisely), since if w ∈ 
DCS, then it is verifiable within polynomial time whether a [guessed] PTPI DTM M on an  
[guessed] input 〈M,s〉 writes w = 〈M,s〉 on its tape and then halts within polynomial on |w| 
(M(“”) = string representing p(|w|)) steps, since at most 2|w| different strings, hence PTPI 
DTMs, may be coded into w, and the running time of that [guessed] M is poly-bounded: it 
suffices to simulate the running of M on 〈M,s〉 during at most that bound of steps and then to 
check the contents of the tape after the simulation has finished, in order to see whether or not 
it is equal to 〈M,s〉. Note that simulating the running of any poly-time DTM on an arbitrary 
input can be done within polynomial time too (as a polynomial is a time-constructible 
function [3]).  
 
Theorem 2.2. The DCS is not in P.  
 
Proof. Can the DCS be in P? No, at all, plainly, since there is no polynomial that 
bounds the running time of the all PTPI DTM (and the polynomial that bounds the running 
time of a specific one is not known neither given for us), and then it is impossible to decide or 
to reduce the DCS into another NP problem within deterministic polynomial time. 
 
That is, the Cook-Levin Theorem is false, since in order to all its proofs work a 
fundamental – but in general neglected – input (information) is absolutely essential and tacitly 
supposed to be known and given to us (or can be computed in deterministic poly-time) in their 
scope [2]: the polynomial running time p(n) of some NTM (Nondeterministic Turing Machine) 
that decides an NP problem (n = |input for it|). With such a p(n) anyway provided (which can 
be considered a hidden assumption or axiom), a poly-time DTM that reduces any instance of 
this problem to an instance of poly-size Boolean formula (or of poly-size Boolean circuit that 
simulates the problem) can always be constructed by us within deterministic poly-time (where 
the size of this generated Boolean formula (or circuit) is in O(log(n) p(n)2)). 
 
However, if such a p(n) is unknown (or is not given to us) neither can be computed in 
deterministic polynomial time, then all these proofs shall fail. They stop utterly working, 
consequently, when such a p(n) is unknown (or not given to us) a priori, since it cannot be 
computed in deterministic polynomial time, as widely known. 
 
See [1], [2] and [10] for details of the demonstration of this amazing fact, and the 
Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 3 below, for some simple examples of possible applications and 
codifications.  
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2.1  Online reverse auction mathematically proven poly-unbreakable 
 
We can now construct a protocol for online [virtual] reverse auction [4] mathematically 
proven unbreakable within polynomial time, by the Theorem 2.2:  
 
It suffices the bidder at the reverse auction to construct a PTPI DTM M, to run it on 
〈M,b〉, where b is a string representing its bid (into some codification form or standard ruled 
by the auctioneer), to concatenate the output with H(〈M,M'〉) (where M' is the inverse machine 
of that M (M'(M(x)) = x) and H is some arbitrary cryptographic hash function [6] ruled by the 
auctioneer too, whom provides it to all the bidders), to store the generated string w in a trusted 
third, sending it to the reverse auctioneer too, and then to hide the PTPI DTMs M and M' from 
the external world, which assures the confidentiality of that bid. Any crypto hash goes here. 
 
After, in a virtual public session, all the bidders present to the reverse auctioneer their 
respective DTMs M and M' in order to recuperate their bids (the winner is who has made the 
lowest one), where obviously there cannot be fraud, because running that M on M'(M(〈M,b〉)) 
during at most the bound of steps (given by that polynomial M(“”) on |input|) and 
concatenating the output with H(〈M,M'〉) must result in that same string w sent to the 
auctioneer, and any other input must result in another [different] output w’ ≠ w, since M and 
M' must be PTPI [bijective] machines. Remember yet that M(〈M,b〉) is part of w, thus it must 
be right. Finally, in case of doubts that trusted third can guarantee the authenticity of that w. 
 
2.2  Distance keys distribution mathematically proven poly-unbreakable 
 
Definition 2.2.1. n-permuting/inverting  DTMs  set  (n-pi-DTM-set). An  n-pi-
DTM-set is a set of n PTPI DTMs M1, M2, …, Mn (not necessarily different machines), 
where Mn(Mn-1(…(M2(M1(〈M1,x〉)))…)) = 〈M1,x〉, that is, the result from running M1 on 〈M1,x〉, 
then running M2 on that result, and so on, until Mn, is that same original string 〈M1,x〉. Notice 
that a 1-pi-DTM-set is an identity PTPI DTM I (I(w) = w). 
 
With the definition above, we can now also construct a system of distance keys 
distribution [5] mathematically proven unbreakable into polynomial time, by the Theorem 2.2: 
 
It is enough to utilize a 4-pi-DTM-set where the user A creates a key k and then sends 
k’ = M1(〈M1,k〉) to the user B, that returns k’’ = M2(k’) to A. A then returns k’’’ = M3(k’’) to 
B, that recuperates that original 〈M1,k〉 = M4(k’’’) and then k = right(〈M1,k〉; |〈M1,k〉|-|〈M1〉|) (k 
is the string formed by the |k| most right positions from 〈M1,k〉). See that B can eventually 
check whether or not the messages are authentic, for the DTM M1 from the 4-pi-DTM-set is 
sent encoded into each message and it is recovered at final. 
 
Observe that the user A does not need to have neither to know M2 and M4, and B does 
not need to have neither to know M1 and M3. 
 
Obs.: notice that, although the users need either trust an initial 4-pi-DTM-set created 
by someone else or in-person meeting in order to create that 4-pi-DTM-set, they need do this 
only once: all communications thereafter can be made by the established secure channel, even 
to exchange other n-pi-DTM-set(s). 
 
Verify that eavesdropping those exchange messages with k’, k’’ or k’’’ does not allow 
to recover that original key k, since these strings are just permutations/inversions of the bits 
from M1 concatenated with k, and the 4-permuting/inverting machines set used in that 
exchanging of messages is utterly hidden from everyone else besides A and B. 
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Note that this method can be used to send any arbitrary string from A to B, or from B 
to A, even other 4-pi-DTM-set, in order to avoid utilizing the same one for many times or 
during a large term, which would be very harmful to the safety of that protocol. 
 
See yet that we can construct a very similar protocol with more general DTMs, not just 
permuting/inverting ones, even with non-length-preserving DTMs (where |input| ≠ |output|). 
 
2.2.1  Example of a 4-pi-DTM-set 
 
Let  f : {0,1}4 → {0,1}4 be a permuting function where: 
(Position of the bit into x) = i σ(i) = (Position of that bit into f (x)) = 2*i mod 5 
1 2 
2 4 
3 1 
4 3 
 
Verify that f ( f ( f ( f (x)))) = x, hence four equal DTMs M that split the [e.g. ASCII 
coded] message into pieces or parts of four bits, apply repeatedly that function on each part, 
and concatenate that outputs, form a 4-pi-DTM-set, as a consequence of 24 ≡ 1 (mod 5).  
 
In order to illustrate the functioning of this 4-pi-DTM-set, we can use it on a little and 
simple plain message: 
Plain 
Text M A T H 
Parts Part1 Part2 Part3 Part4 Part5 Part6 Part7 Part8 
Bit Pos. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Bits x0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
x1=
 
f(x0) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
'Text' x1 ☻ ☻ 1 ☻ 
x2=
 
f(x1) 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
'Text' x2 + ( Ó ! 
x3=
 
f(x2) 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
'Text' x3 Ä Ä  Ã É 
x4=
 
f(x3) 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Text x4 M A T H 
 
Note that replacing above those {0,1}4 by {0,1}p-1 (where p is any odd prime number), 
that formula 2*i mod 5 by k*i mod p, where k is not multiple of p, and "groups of four bits" 
by "groups of p-1 bits", we can construct in a similar manner an ordp(k)-pi-DTM-set, because 
kordp(k) ≡ 1 (mod p), that is, the bits return to their original positions after ordp(k) M runnings, 
where ordp(k) is the multiplicative order of k modulo p. [7] 
 
Notice yet that any n-pi-DTM-set whose construction is publicly known shall be very 
unsafe for cryptographic purposes, obviously. So, they must be constructed with creativity 
and originality, if they are intended to be used into some serious cryptographic protocol. 
 
2.3  Secure communication mathematically proven poly-unbreakable 
 
With the protocol introduced in Section 2.2, we can make a secure communication 
mathematically proven poly-unbreakable, by the Theorem 2.2: it suffices to utilize a 2-pi-
DTM-set where a user A can send an arbitrary message m by sending m’ = M1(〈M1,m〉) to the 
user B, that recuperates that original 〈M1,m〉 = M2(m’) and then m = right(〈M1,m〉; |〈M1,m〉|-
|〈M1〉|) (m is the string formed by the |m| most right positions from 〈M1,m〉). 
 
As in Section 2.2, B can eventually check the authenticity of the messages and this 
method can even be used to a user send other 2-pi-DTM-set to another one, in order to avoid 
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using the same DTMs repeatedly, by safety reasons. If they want it, the user A can yet send 
only m to B, without concatenating with 〈M1〉 neither with something else at all, or 
concatenating it with any other arbitrary string(s). 
 
Observe also that the Kerckhoffs' Principle [12] is not valid for the new cryptographic 
processes introduced herein, since the proper n-pi-DTM-sets act as were the keys w.r.t these 
processes. 
 
 
3.  Example of a 2-pi-DTM-set in JavaScript 
 
The JavaScript code f  below is an example of a 2-pi-DTM-set, since it is a PTPI 
DTM and f (  f (x)) = x: 
 
<textarea id="ti1" value="TEST" rows="15" cols="190">Enter herein the encrypting/decrypting code 
 
(Example of code on the paper "The Dead Cryptographers Society Problem", 
at https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1501/1501.03872.pdf) 
{ 
Enter herein the plain/cyphered text in order to be cyphered/decyphered 
} 
</textarea> 
<textarea id="ti2" value="TEST" rows="5" cols="190">That plain/cyphered text showed in binary</textarea> 
<textarea id="ti3" value="TEST" rows="5" cols="190">The cyphered/decyphered text showed in binary</textarea> 
<textarea id="ti4" value="TEST" rows="15" cols="190">That cyphered/decyphered text showed in character</textarea> 
<textarea id="ti5" value="TEST" rows="1" cols="190"></textarea> 
<button onclick="Convert();">Encrypt/Decrypt</button> 
 
<script> 
function Convert() {  
  var  Plain_Text    = document.getElementById("ti1"); // The plain/cyphered text in ASCII 
  var  Binary_Text   = document.getElementById("ti2"); // The plain/cyphered text into binary  
  var  Binary_Cypher = document.getElementById("ti3"); // The cyphered/decyphered text into binary  
  var  Cypher_Text   = document.getElementById("ti4"); // The cyphered/decyphered text in ASCII 
  var  Msg_Text      = document.getElementById("ti5"); // The msg text for copy to the clipboard 
 
  if (Plain_Text.value == ""){ 
    Cypher_Text.value = "T(n) = 1000*n^2"; 
  } 
  else{ 
    var p = 1288; // Size of the blocks (should be an odd prime - 1) 
    var q = 3456; // Controls 1 and 2 of the bit-inverted positions ... 
    var r  = 7890; // ... (can be any two arbitrary integers) 
 
    k = Plain_Text.value.length; 
    Binary_Text.value = ""; 
 
    for (i=0; i < k; i++) { // That plain/cyphered text showed in binary 
      Binary_Text.value += Right("00000000" + Plain_Text.value[i].charCodeAt(0).toString(2), 8);   
    } 
 
    Binary_Cypher.value = Binary_Text.value; 
    k  = Binary_Text.value.length; 
    s  = k % p; 
    k -= s; 
 
    for (i=0; i < k; i++) { // The cyphered text transformed and showed in binary 
      j = (i % p) + 1; 
      Perm_i = (p*j) % (p+1) - 1 + parseInt(i/p) * p; 
      if ((q % ((q*r)/(Perm_i+i))) % 2) 
        Binary_Cypher.value = setCharAt(Binary_Cypher.value, i, Binary_Text.value.charAt(Perm_i)); 
      else 
        Binary_Cypher.value = setCharAt(Binary_Cypher.value, i, Binary_Text.value.charAt(Perm_i) == "0" ? "1" : "0"); 
    } 
 
    k += s; 
    for (i=k-s; i < k; i++) { // The cyphered text transformed and showed in binary 
      Binary_Cypher.value = setCharAt(Binary_Cypher.value, i, Binary_Text.value.charAt(i) == "0" ? "1" : "0"); 
    } 
 
    Cypher_Text.value = ""; 
    k--; 
    for (i=0; i < k; i += 8) { // The cyphered text transformed and showed in character 
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         Cypher_Text.value += String.fromCharCode(parseInt(Binary_Cypher.value.substring(i, i+8), 2)); } 
    document.getElementById("ti4").focus(); 
    document.getElementById("ti4").select(); 
    Msg_Text.value = "<Ctrl + C> Copies the Cyphered/Decyphered Text to the Clipboard"; 
  } 
} 
function Right(str, n){ 
  if (n <= 0) 
     return ""; 
  else if (n > String(str).length) 
     return str; 
  else { 
     var iLen = String(str).length; 
     return String(str).substring(iLen, iLen - n); 
  } 
} 
function setCharAt(str, index, chr) { 
  if(index > str.length-1) return str; 
  return str.substring(0, index) + chr + str.substring(index+1); 
} 
function gcd(a, b) { 
  return !b ? a : gcd(b, a % b); 
} 
</script> 
 
The code above can be run and tested in this webpage: 
 
http://www.andrebarbosa.eti.br/Cryptor-DeCryptor_DCS.html. 
 
Into this webpage, enter (or copy/paste) a plain text in order to be ciphered in the first 
field, press the <Encrypt/Decrypt> button, and then the ciphered text shall appear (selected) in 
the result field. Copy this ciphered text, paste it in the first field and press again the <Encrypt/ 
Decrypt> button. Then, the original plain text should come out deciphered in the result field. 
 
Notice that, even though trillions of different 2-pi-DTM-set’s can be created basing 
on that code simply by mean of changing the integer variables p, q and r into it, it is very 
unsecure using it in order to seriously encrypt messages or files, since that code is publicly 
known. However, verify whether that security of this encryption can be improved if the 
message or file contents (plain text) is padded with (LCM(p, 8*length of it [in characters]) – 
8*length of it [in characters]) repeated characters: “*”, for example. (Why or why not?) 
 
Challenge for cryptanalysis: The integers p, q and r into the JavaScript code above 
were changed, thereby generating a new specific 2-pi-DTM-set. Then, a small message was 
encrypted by it, resulting the following ciphered text (some characters are non-printable, but 
they can be read as ASCII bits below): 
 
YéÕûKY11Yû ûY9‰ÑyMû™ÑyIYéiû19iY± û1‹I ÙY 
 
(Into ASCII bits:     01011001 11101001 11010101 11111011 01001011 01011001 00110001 00110001 01011001 11111011 00001001 
11111011 01011001 00111001 10001001 11010001 01111001 01001101 11111011 10011001 11010001 01111001 01001001 01011001 
11101001 01101001 11111011 00110001 00111001 01101001 01011001 10110001 10011101 11111011 00110001 10001011 01001001 
00001001  11011001 01011001) 
 
 The challenge is: What is the plain text of that message? Is there an efficient algorithm 
in order to compute those integers p, q and r (given that JavaScript code and arbitrary number 
of ciphered texts of arbitrary lengths)? 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
 The conclusion is that we can create very secure communication protocol, like other 
surprising algorithms and programs, using disparaged ideas; hence maybe we should not 
summarily disregard new ideas into Theoretical Computer Science as weird and irrelevant 
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ones, because they can perhaps be useful in unexpected applications upon inventive and 
creative minds, into a very dynamical technological world. 
 
 
5. Freedom & Mathematics 
 
 “– The essence of Mathematics is Freedom.” (Georg Cantor) [8] 
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